"The Economics of Cognition. III. A Weak Axiom of Revealed Cognitive Preference"
This paper models cognitive rationality and formulates a weak axiom of revealed cognitive preference (WARCP) for its study. It starts from the basic intuition that when an agent chooses to believe (as revealed by choices or betting behavior) one model, theory or prepositional belief over another, that agent does so on the basis of a set of reasons, adherence to which in the face of refuting or confirming evidence reveals (a) a preference for a certain inference logic over another and (b) a preference for a certain kind of justification logic over another. The space of inference and justification logics is characterized in the paper. Inference logics are shown to follow one of three basic patterns (inductive, deductive or abductive). Justification logics are shown to follow one of two basic patterns (justificationist and falsificationist) with sub-categories properly corresponding to each (circular, regressive and dogmatic justificationism and dogmatic or methodological (naïve or sophisticated) falsificationism). Experimental paradigms for the study of foundational cognitive choices are studied, and a Weak Axiom of Revealed Cognitive Preference (WARCP) is articulated.