

PRELUDE:

GLOBAL CONTROL, ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

From the time of the creation of the New England Complex Systems Institute and the first International Conference on Complex Systems in 1997, various members of the intelligence community have expressed interest in learning about complex systems to gain insights relevant to their own concerns. In one of a series of interactions, Mai Nguyen and a colleague from one of the intelligence agencies visited NECSI during the summer of 2001. They were interested in enhancing the ability of the intelligence community to anticipate the locations of ethnic violence. They gave me an article describing a case study of a town in Indonesia that had been the site of terrible violence between Christians and Moslems. They asked me about creating a model that would predict whether a particular town would be the site of such violence, taking into consideration various factors about the town. There are studies that identify particular aspects of a country that are correlated with the rise of violence. Many factors might be considered. Some of these factors might be political, such as the type of government or the behavior of leadership, some might be educational, some financial, and so on. The correlational studies use existing events where violence occurs to look at the factors that seem to be associated with and might help determine the likelihood that ethnic violence will occur at a given location. Another approach, the approach that the visitors expected I would take, would be to identify a set of key causal influences, social, political,

economic, historical, and develop a model that would take these causal influences into consideration in describing the reason that one particular town would become the site of violence.

My answer to them was based on a different kind of analysis, one dealing with the overall characteristics of the dynamics of civilization today. These issues were on my mind when I wrote my textbook several years previously. I felt inhibited from discussing them in the textbook because of the sensitive nature of the topic. However, I described them in responding to the question posed about ethnic violence.

The analysis of social change that is provided by a multiscale perspective suggests that over time it is becoming unreasonable to expect all groups of people to mix peacefully. In some cases, there is a natural process of separation that results from this phenomenon. Where separation is taking place, but areas are still mixed, conflict naturally occurs due to the frustration of desires of the different groups for control. A quite reasonable solution to conflict in this case, therefore, is to resolve issues of control peacefully early on rather than waiting for violence to occur. If there are appropriate boundaries between the groups, they may exist peacefully side by side, but without mixing. Thus, adopting the approach of arranging for separation, like the separation of two children who frequently fight, or like the old saying “good fences make good neighbors”⁸⁴ seems a good strategy. Recognizing that local wars, often due to ethnic violence, have been estimated to have taken over 40 million lives in the 50 years after the world wars,⁸⁵ and with many existing conflicts today and new conflicts arising annually, perhaps we should recognize that insisting that all people live peacefully together in a single mixed community is not necessary, rather all people can live peacefully with appropriate separation.

Viewed globally, the world today appears to be undergoing a natural process of separation between certain groups. The process is similar to the separation between oil and water. This separation acts as a kind of pattern formation, similar also to the kids in kindergarten in Chapter 2 separating into regions of those who wanted particular kinds of toys. The most prominent group that is separating from others is the Islamic world. Changes that are taking place in the rest of the world, and changes that are taking place in the Islamic world are making the two groups less compatible as far as mixed coexistence, requiring more separation for peaceful coexistence. As this process takes place, violence arises in areas where the natural process of separation is not occurring fast enough or smoothly enough to satisfy the people who are mixed at the boundaries. Arranging

for peaceful, voluntary separation seems to be the best alternative to the violence that is occurring today in many parts of the world.

In view of this realization, I suggested to the intelligence community visitors to take out a map of the world and mark on it the boundary between Islam and other groups. At locations where this boundary was unclear and populations were mixed, there would be ethnic violence. It is important to emphasize that as far as I am concerned this is a case of global pattern formation and differentiation, not a story of good and evil. The model of separation does not value one side or the other, but recognizes that the boundary between them is a dynamic and often hazardous place to live. The reason for my statement has to do with the dramatically different trends in the Islamic world than the rest of the world over the past few decades as discussed in this chapter. A similar but not quite the same conclusion was reached earlier by Sam Huntington in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.⁸⁶ Unlike Huntington, I do not suggest that this is about intrinsic conflict between “civilizations,” but rather about the dynamics of domain and boundary formation within a global civilization. Recognizing this suggests a different approach to solving the problem: Clear boundaries.

Creating an effective global society without violence will require a new form of respect and appreciation of cultural differences. This respect for differences occurs at the group rather than at the individual level. It is not enough to consider individual freedoms in establishing choice of culture within a diverse society, it is also necessary to consider the rights of groups to establish collective behaviors that are not the same as those that others would choose. Only by developing this form of respect can we diffuse ethnic violence and conflict, i.e. conflict at the group level.

A couple of months after my discussion with these visitors the events of 9/11 occurred. Today, after 9/11, it is more acceptable to discuss these issues in public. Still, not everyone will agree that my conclusions will be the right course of action. Time will tell.

CHAPTER 16

GLOBAL CONTROL, ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Toward decentralized control

In considering the properties of ethnic violence and terrorism, it is useful to step back and consider some overall societal changes that have been taking place over the past few decades. In the first part of the book, and in other chapters in this part of the book, I discussed the role of hierarchical control in organizations. The conclusion reached was that a hierarchically controlled system is not effective when presented with a highly complex context that requires significant coordination of the collective behaviors of the organization. Historical trends suggest that we have reached a point where the socio-economic environment is too complex for hierarchical control of organizations.

During the 1980s, many countries changed from hierarchical control to more distributed control forms of government. This is apparent in Central and South America where dictatorial forms of government in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay became more democratic in their political institutions with more open economic systems. It would not have been surprising for any one of these to change because there had been many switches back and forth before that time. What is remarkable is that

over a period of ten years, all of them switched in one direction and have stayed that way ever since. The only centrally controlled system remaining in the Western hemisphere is Cuba. Elsewhere in the world there are also examples of such changes, notably in Greece, the Philippines, and South Africa.

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the growth of legal corporate ownership and free markets within communist China over the same decade also reflect dramatic changes away from hierarchically controlled governments. Very few people anticipated the Soviet collapse because it was counter to the experience of history. Governments generally don't give up control or power, even when circumstances are very difficult for the government or for the people of the country. Often the government itself can be responsible for economic and social problems and still persist.

Indeed, what is particularly remarkable about many (not all) of these transitions is that they were peaceful. This is counter to the historical pattern that can be seen in the French revolution at the end of the 18th century or the Russian revolution at the beginning of the 20th century. The French and Russian revolutions began with an effort to reform a government that was not functioning well. Gradually the reform process became more radical, then there was a bloody revolution, which led to a new but still hierarchical form of government. This dynamic, which led back to a hierarchy, suggests that despite the limitations of hierarchical control, it was the stable form of government in the face of social disorder. By contrast, many of the more recent changes in government have been peaceful. In some cases, the individual or individuals in control simply "gave up" this control.

The movement away from hierarchical governments was not the only place where major changes in control occurred. During this same period, changes in corporate control structure took place in many companies in the U.S. and elsewhere. Management change became a major factor starting in the early 1980s with the widespread adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM). The principles of TQM led to changes in the roles of managers. From our perspective, the main point is that teams of individuals become responsible for decisions rather than a single person, e.g., the CEO. In the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, TQM and other approaches such as the Learning Organization, Reengineering, High Performance Organization, and Lean Manufacturing, have led organizations to adopt structures that are more distributed in control and in which

information passes laterally through the organization instead of up and down the hierarchy.

The dramatic changes in control in governments, both dictatorships and communist, and the similarly widespread changes in corporate control suggest that the global environment has become too complex for a single person in charge of a hierarchical organization to respond to. Therefore, centrally controlled, and even decentralized but still hierarchical structures where the large-scale behaviors are centrally controlled became ineffective. This is consistent with the widespread recognition of the complexity of modern life. It is also consistent with the increasing global interdependence that exposes countries and corporations to many and varied forces that require effective response.

More directly, the implication is that the large-scale complexity of human organizations has reached the point where it is greater than that of a single human being at the scale of human communication. The reason we feel this complexity in an intense way is that when the complexity is larger than a human being, it is not only difficult to control, it is also impossible to understand fully. This is why government and corporate leaders have often by themselves made the decision to transfer their control to others. If they could figure out what to do to solve problems, they would not have done so.

We can also take a different approach to seeing the way hierarchical control doesn't work for complex systems. Consider the food supply to a large city, for example, Boston. Think of all the different kinds of food, the different ways food is delivered, trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes. Some of it is refrigerated; much of it has to arrive within a limited time. Think of all the storage facilities that are involved in storing this food. Also, think of all the different places it goes: supermarkets, restaurants and other institutions. The right foods have to arrive at the right time in the right amounts, and so on. What would happen if we tried to control this centrally? The answer is that we would have to limit the number of types of food and the number of places that it arrived; even then things would arrive at the wrong times in the wrong quantities. This scenario is reminiscent of food supply in Moscow before the breakup of the Soviet Union.⁸⁷

In the Soviet Union tremendous effort was devoted to planning the economy. There was a general five-year plan, and then there were detailed one-year plans that were broken up further into one-month plans. They used a form of computerized scientific management, as well as a careful negotiation process between individuals who were responsible for indi-

vidual enterprises in the system. In the one-year plans, the flow of materials, products, labor and money was directly specified for each product within each enterprise. Not only was what went in and out specified but also where it came from and where it went to. On a daily basis (and then weekly, monthly and yearly) the flows of money were monitored by the banking system so that they corresponded to the plans. The prices were set centrally so that the flows of money corresponded to the flow of materials, products and labor. The planners were well aware of the U.S. free market system and they viewed it as wasteful. Planning, they believed, would lead to increased efficiency due to an elimination of wasteful duplication of effort. In the free market system there are multiple companies doing the same thing. This repetition of effort seems to planners to be a waste of labor and capital.

How well did the planned system work?

In a supermarket in Moscow, the total number of possible foods you might find was only roughly a hundred. Start counting them: sugar, salt, pepper, bread (a few kinds), meat (beef, chicken, pork), milk, cheese (a few kinds), macaroni, potatoes, cabbage, beets, carrots, pickles, and so on. There was almost no fresh fruit and vegetables, though a few were found in a limited season: tomatoes and fresh cucumbers from August to October, plums in September, apples in the fall, and strawberries for two weeks at the beginning of summer. Forget packaging. There was none.

This is not even the whole story. Most of the time even these foods were not available. It was a system where scarcity was the rule. People had to be satisfied with what there was, not what they wanted. They waited in line for food and were alert to food arrivals in stores to be sure to get some. Much of the food was often partly spoiled and beer and milk were often watered down. Waste was very high, 20–50%, even though the items were very scarce. A substantial fraction of fresh fruit rotted in warehouses. Because of the scarcity people couldn't be picky about what they bought. Waiting in line and shopping generally took a substantial fraction of people's time and a significant fraction of income was spent on food.

This was the main food system of the Soviet Union. There were several others that provided the means for people to get additional items. There were farmers' markets, black markets, and some stores that were exclusive to the privileged few. The farmers' markets were the main source of additional food options, though at significantly higher prices.

Contrast this with the U.S. food supply system at the time.⁸⁸ American supermarkets in this period were stocked with well over 10,000 products

(today nearly 40,000), selected from over a hundred thousand possible products by supermarket owners (with 20,000 new products introduced annually, only a small fraction of which succeed). Many forms of processed and prepared food were readily available. Food of various types, prices and qualities was available at essentially all times (24/7) and in all locations. The economy as a whole was and is consumer-limited rather than supply-limited, so that advertising is necessary for sellers to promote their products.

There is a direct connection between the failure of the Soviet food system to provide adequate improvement and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The person “in charge” of agriculture in the USSR from 1978–1985 was Mikhail Gorbachev, before he rose to become General Secretary in 1985. His college degree was as an agronomist-economist. The ineffectiveness of the agricultural system led to Gorbachev’s efforts to change the Soviet system and might be considered among the immediate causes of the collapse of the USSR. The leaders of the USSR were very aware of the comparison of their effectiveness as measured in comparison with the U.S. and other countries. Thus, we would be well justified in saying that the inability to perform the complex task of food production and supply, as compared with the effectiveness in other places, contributed to the downfall of the centrally planned economy of the USSR.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the free markets in China, the change of many governments from dictatorships to more democratic systems and the implementation of TQM in corporations all point to the inability of central control to effectively manage the complexity of modern social organizations in the face of complex external forces and demands.

Exceptions

Once we recognize the dramatic tendency in much of the world toward decentralized control, it is interesting to consider where the exceptions exist. Two of the most prominent countries that have not followed this trend are Cuba and North Korea. Both of these are small countries that are almost completely isolated from the rest of the world because of the persistence of a conflict with the U.S. This isolation prevents these countries from being exposed to the complexity of the world, a complexity that other countries must cope with. The result is that the internal society remains simple and central control continues to be effective even if it is difficult for the people to tolerate, as manifest in the case of North Korea where the food supply has been severely limited in recent years.

Interestingly, this analysis suggests that the U.S. policies in isolating these countries are themselves responsible for retention of the governments that are an anathema to the U.S. Of course, the reasons for their isolation by the U.S. may have nothing to do with any desire to change their form of government. Political conclusions aside, the existence of central control in these contexts can be understood directly from the issues of environmental complexity that we have analyzed. Simplifying the external environment that these countries operate in, allows their centrally controlled structures to continue.

Toward central control

There are two other parts of the world, however, where central control continues to be widespread. The first is in the Arab, and more broadly the Islamic world, while the second is in sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding the first is central to topic of this chapter. The latter is a highly diverse but generally undeveloped area that is a context for many of the key global problems of poverty, development, ethnic violence, and disease.

When we consider the trends of central control in the Islamic world, we find that many countries have become more centrally controlled rather than less so, over the same time period when dictatorships and communist regimes elsewhere have disappeared. Well-known examples of societies that were much more open before this period than at the end, include Lebanon and Iran. In many cases, religious extremism has been a clear driving force for change toward a closed and restricted society.

Taking the list of all Islamic countries, we find that monarchies tend to be located near the origins of Islam, in the Arabian peninsula. Radiating outward from there we find constitutional monarchies, dictatorships/military strongmen, republics with self-perpetuating authoritarian presidents, and a few democratic republics in the farthest areas, particularly Turkey and Western Africa, and (recently) Indonesia. The trend toward centralization has been clear throughout much of the region. The stability of the centralized governments has become apparent with the passing of control from father to son in Syria and Jordan, and the transfer of power in Egypt. Some recent exceptions that represent a trend toward democratization near the boundaries (Indonesia, Pakistan, Western African states), have yet to demonstrate their stability, with Pakistan already reverting, at least temporarily, to military control.

A list of approximate governmental forms is as follows:⁸⁹

Arabian peninsula:

Bahrain (constitutional monarchy)
Kuwait (monarchy)
Oman (monarchy)
Qatar (monarchy)
Saudi Arabia (monarchy)
Yemen (republic—strong president)
United Arab Emirates (federated kingdoms).

Northwest of Arabia:

Jordan (monarchy)
Lebanon (republic, post civil war)
Syria (military regime/dictatorship)
Turkey (democracy).

Northeast of Arabia:

Afghanistan (theocratic military rule, warring militias [prior to U.S. military action])
Iran (theocratic republic)
Iraq (republic—military strongman [prior to U.S. military action])
Pakistan (military strongman).

Further Northeast—former Soviet Republics (all to be considered in transition):

Azerbaijan (republic)
Turkmenistan (republic—president for life)
Uzbekistan (republic—authoritarian president)
Kyrgyzstan (republic)
Kazakhstan (republic—authoritarian president)
Tajikistan (republic, civil unrest).

East of Arabia including Southeast Asia:

Bangladesh (parliamentary democracy)
Brunei (monarchy)
Comoros (unstable military rule)
Indonesia (military strongman till 1998, republic & ethnic violence since)
Malaysia (constitutional monarchy)
Maldives (republic, same president for 25 years).

South of Arabia (Across the Gulf of Aden):

Djibouti (republic)
Somalia (warlords)

West of Arabia—North Africa (bordering the Mediterranean Sea):

Algeria (republic—strong president)

- Egypt (republic—strong president)
- Libya (military dictatorship)
- Morocco (constitutional monarchy)
- Tunisia (republic—one party).
- West of Arabia—Next tier Africa (bordering North Africa):
 - Chad (republic—oligarchic control—conflict with south part)
 - Niger (republic from 1999)
 - Sudan (military/Islamic regime—conflict with south part).
- Further West—West Africa:
 - Gambia (republic, from 1996)
 - Guinea (republic—military ruler still president)
 - Mali (republic, from 1991)
 - Mauritania (republic—one party)
 - Senegal (republic)
 - Sierra Leone (republic—civil unrest).

Others have made this observation, particularly since 9/11. In an article by Fareed Zakaria in *Newsweek*⁹⁰ this point was explicitly made. He states, “In an almost unthinkable reversal of a global pattern, almost every Arab country today is less free than it was 30 years ago. There are few countries in the world of which one can say that.”

To address the frequent claim that economics of poverty is the driving force of such changes, or the opposite that oil wealth might be the driving force, he clearly articulates the absence of economic motivation through the statement, “If poverty ... [was responsible] in most of Arabia, wealth ... [was responsible] in the rest of it.... All that the rise of oil prices has done over three decades is to produce a new class of rich....”

What is the reason for this dramatic difference? The causes are clearly not just economic; they are primarily cultural, with religion as the driving force. Among the key elements of Islamic culture that are relevant to this trend is the accepted understanding that the state is responsible for imposition of cultural norms within an Islamic society. This is directly counter to the promotion of individual freedom and diversity that is characteristic of Western thought and is at the center of systems that are not centrally controlled. This difference also leads to a local incompatibility of the socio-cultural systems.

This incompatibility of local social perspective can be understood as analogous to the incompatibility of oil and water. When the two are mixed they tend to separate. As they separate, larger regions of one and the other

form and the ongoing process of separation occurs at the boundary between the two. A process of pattern formation takes place, similar to the discussion of fads in Part I of this book. The boundaries become better defined, smoother and flatter over time. When we think of this process, the analogy to ethnic violence as it has occurred in many parts of the world appears clear. Indeed, we can consult lists of the locations where ethnic violence is currently occurring or has been taking place over recent years and we find that a large majority of them are located along the boundary between Islamic areas and other areas. It is important to emphasize that which side is the aggressor is not the issue in this context. It is also not a question of determining which side is in the right or wrong. The key is recognizing the underlying process that is taking place. In order to do so we must see the connection between all of these conflicts rather than considering any one of them in particular. Each one has a specific and detailed history with local historical aspects that are not shared with other conflicts.

Violence at the boundary between Islam and Christianity (Western and Orthodox) occurs in Bosnia, Chechnya (part of Russia), Philippines, and Indonesia. It occurs between Islam and Hinduism in Kashmir (part of India). Violence in Africa includes conflict between Islam and various local cultural groups that are becoming increasingly Christian. Violence between Islam and Judaism occurs in Israel.

The recognition of the importance of the boundary between Islamic and non-Islamic areas resonates with but is different from the ideas of Sam Huntington. His book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, describes the relevance of conflict between the major different cultural regions of the world just at the time when the conflict with the Soviet Union had ended. The next conflict, Huntington argued, would be between the different “civilizations” of the world. While he considered the conflict between civilizations generally, he emphasized the conflict between Islam and others. Here, this conflict is reconsidered. Conflict is not intrinsic to the relationships between the civilizations, but rather results from a need to differentiate between local conditions in the different cultures and thus establish clear boundaries between them.

The key to understanding the incompatibility of Islam and other cultural systems lies in understanding the characteristics of organization and the level of uniformity. Other systems have a greater respect for individual differences and diversity. Islam insists on a significant level of conformity to cultural behavior patterns. Such conformity must be imposed collectively, leading to the need for Islam-based institutions, including desire for

an Islamic state.

Some may argue that what is needed are educational efforts to moderate religious views. However, this approach reflects an intolerance for both individual and group level choices. Tolerance at the individual level is also not the same as tolerance at a societal level. Should a society have the right to impose uniformity? Because Western culture values freedom of choice at the individual level, it does not tolerate the larger scale choice of the Islamic culture. We see here directly the conflict between larger scale and finer scale behavior discussed in the first part of this book. The cultures are intrinsically incompatible because of the primary scale at which freedom of action is allowed.

The implication of this analysis is that separation of these two cultural systems is likely to continue. If separation continues, then, as the boundaries between the two systems become clearer, the problems of ethnic violence will diminish. Indeed, the best way to inhibit ethnic violence is to promote the separation rather than discourage it. A key question then becomes how to structure the boundary between the systems. For example, what level of commerce and interactions will be possible? The answer is likely to differ in different parts of the world. In general, however, many forms of trade of commercial goods should be possible.

The ideal that everybody should be able to live together in harmony has here a different form of realization than that at the individual level. The vision presented here is the harmony of cultures existing together at a larger scale of organization—not of individuals mixing and interacting freely throughout the world. Two cultures can coexist peacefully when they have the appropriate interactions and the appropriate separations.

Terrorism and global military actions

The local interactions of ethnic violence at the boundary of Islamic and non-Islamic regions also have a global (not local) aspect: terrorism and the asymmetric War on Terrorism and global military actions. Global terrorism manifested itself in 9/11 and in earlier bombings (hijackings, etc.) aimed at Western entities. These are asymmetrically countered by police actions around the world, limitations on travel and financial flows, and military actions in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

As discussed in Chapter 9, the War on Terrorism is a highly complex one requiring diverse actions in many places around the world. Among the actions that are needed is a reduction in the occurrence and severity of local ethnic conflicts. These local wars create regions of lawlessness and

violence that breed terrorists, motivate the formation of organized terrorist groups, and provide bases for operations. Groups formed in regions of conflict support each other in developing international activities including training and coordination of terrorist actions.

Terrorism is also linked to the process of separation between Islamic and non-Islamic populations in other ways. This includes practical as well as intentional aspects of the terrorist actions. Practically speaking, terrorism increases the difficulty and risk of travel for non-Muslims to go to Islamic countries, and for Muslims to go to non-Islamic countries. Also, one of the stated demands of terrorists is the departure of non-Muslims from Islamic countries. Indeed, a key stated reason for the terror against the U.S. is the departure of military personnel from the Islamic holy land of Saudi Arabia. The strong sense of a need for total separation is also clear from the reception of U.S. forces in Iraq even by those who have been freed from the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein. These effects manifest the underlying forces toward separation.

The existence of such a widespread desire for separation may also undermine many aspects of the current strategy (or other strategies that might be adopted) in the War on Terrorism. Actions that promote more individuals to adopt a course of violence will be counter productive. Acting in a way that respects the underlying social concerns but still opposes terrorist activities, would be much more effective. Such actions will avoid increasing terrorist recruitment and formation of new terror organizations. In particular, strategies that involve placing non-Islamic individuals into Islamic countries should be considered a last resort.

The current conflict in Iraq can also be considered in this context. There are many and varied political approaches to this context. For some, this war is an extension of the 1991 Gulf War to expel Iraqi military forces from Kuwait. The rapid and successful completion of the objectives and the positive reception to the U.S. involvement in 1991 led many to have expectations for similar outcomes today. It is important to develop a better understanding of the key differences between the current Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War.

To analyze some of these differences, we can focus on the connections between people. In the Gulf War the enemy of the U.S. was an occupying Iraqi army located in Kuwait. In the Iraq war the proclamations about the war against Saddam Hussein and his dictatorial and ruthless regime were couched in the same way. The idea that the U.S. would serve as liberators of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime seems very reasonable.

Yet, the military force that opposed the U.S. in this conflict had fathers and mothers, siblings and children—members of the population that were being “freed” from them. Those opposing military forces were much more connected to the people of Iraq than are the U.S. forces. No matter how violent a regime was present there, this factor implies that there are many individuals who will feel that the U.S. is not a liberator but an alien entity. When this is combined with the deep internal divisions within Iraq (between oppressed and oppressor, religious and secular), and the severe cultural clash between all of these groups and the U.S. forces, it is easy to recognize that the situation is not easy to control.

More significantly, when we consider the historical role of Saddam Hussein, we notice that in the past the U.S. was his supporter. Why would this be the case? The reason is that Saddam was opposing the extreme religious government of Iran. Today there is a sense that Saddam developed chemical and biological weapons for war against the U.S. Without justifying such weapons, we should recognize that this is not the case. Saddam developed these weapons in his battle with Iran, a brutal regime. Internally in his country, Saddam was suppressing the same fundamentalist Islamic groups that made Iran the country it is today. Thus, Saddam’s historical role has been as a secular military dictator in opposition to fundamentalist Islamic forces and this is a pattern we find repeated in other parts of the Islamic world. The brutality of Saddam’s regime is well documented. Still, a classic analysis of friends and enemies would place him against, not with, the most virulently anti-Western groups. Now, the U.S. has “rescued” these anti-Western groups by invading Iraq. While some may think they would be grateful, given their fundamental views on the world, we should not be surprised that they have limited interest in welcoming the U.S. Moreover, Iraq’s opposition to Iran has been diminished, providing opportunity for Iran to focus on its opposition to the West. Of course, in the context of the cultural divide, both the secular and the religious Islamic groups may be anti-Western. What we should realize, however, is that a natural course of events that may follow from the ouster of Saddam would lead to another government like Iran’s where religion plays the role of suppressing individual freedoms. Alternatively, and somewhat less likely, is the development of another kind of dictatorship. Democratization of Iraq, that some would like to believe possible, is not likely in the context of these forces.

This, however, is not even the greatest problem. The greatest immediate problem is the ongoing intimate engagement between U.S. forces and Is-

lam in Iraq. This contact is directly counter to the need for separation, and a great source of irritation, like a mixing of oil and water. The most natural outcome of such an engagement is the development of a new area of disorder that serves as a substrate for terrorist activities. This is the greatest source of concern when the larger pattern of separation is considered!

Conclusion

Ethnic violence and the related terrorism are not necessarily rooted in conventional military conflict. It is a cultural/political/social challenge. While many people may view these conflicts in terms of desires for conquest, the underlying pattern can be viewed as one of global pattern formation and differentiation. It seems reasonable, therefore, to see the conflict as a need for separation. In the meantime, the U.S. is fighting this separation and appears to be following an underlying assumption that individuals (Western or not) should have the freedom to be anywhere. Ultimately, it is this priority that seems to be a losing ideological battle.

The existing national boundaries generally do not align with the cultural boundaries that are forming. In order to avoid violence we must promote the separation of groups that are currently mixed or are subject to common governing structures. This may involve negotiating new administrative regions with clear boundaries (geographic or behavioral), possibly even physical barriers or guarded borders. In many cases in order to provide a clear separation it may be necessary to provide financial help or incentives for individuals to move, or even to negotiate the movement of larger groups of people. Each circumstance should be considered in its own historical and cultural framework, but with attention to the global patterning process underway. The expectation that distinct approaches to ways of life will be able to reside side by side is not unreasonable as long as the contact between them is bounded in its scope. Commerce and trade can occur across cultural boundaries and respect the ideological divides. Diversity of cultures living together peacefully is not the same as having all individuals peacefully mixed together. However, it is a reasonable view of the ultimate nature of global peace.